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REMARKS ON SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Michael Blechman*
In United States jurisprudence, two quite different legal concepts are both labeled jurisdiction. In personam or personal jurisdiction refers to the extent to which a court has power over a
particular defendant. Subject matter jurisdiction is an entirely
different concept that addresses the question of whether a particular law is intended to apply to different kinds of conduct. In the
antitrust area, for example, obtaining subject matter jurisdiction
depends upon whether conduct within the United States has a
sufficient impact on interstate commerce or foreign conduct has a
sufficient impact on United States domestic or export commerce
to be within the reach of the Sherman or Clayton Acts.
In personam or personal jurisdiction is an important threshold
issue that often arises in litigation which has an international dimension. The outer limits of personal jurisdiction have constitutional due process ramifications. To comport with "fair dealing
and substantial justice," a defendant can be sued only in that jurisdiction where he has sufficient minimum contacts. The content
of this standard is delineated in a large body of case law.
Related to the notion of personal jurisdiction, the question of
venue must often be considered in litigation. What is the right
court in which to sue the defendant? A number of statutes determine the circumstances under which a defendant can be sued in a
particular court. In an antitrust case, section 12 of the Clayton
Act, a special venue statute, allows suit to be brought in any jurisdiction where the defendant resides or is found or transacts business. For foreign defendants, only the "transacting business" test
is of substantive importance because such a defendant, by definition, neither resides nor is found in a local jurisdiction. How
much contact must the defendant have with a particular jurisdiction in order to be found to transact business there? In the antitrust area, the types of contact necessary to meet the "transacting
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business" test for venue purposes are the same as those needed to
establish the minimum contacts required for in personam jurisdiction. Thus, in an antitrust case, if venue is established under
section 12 of the Clayton Act, as a practical matter, in personam
jurisdiction is established as well.
In addition to section 12 of the Clayton Act, venue over foreign
persons can be established under the Alien Venue Act. This Act
provides that an alien can be sued anywhere in the United States
under the rationale that it is equally inconvenient for the alien to
make an appearance in California, Tennessee, New York, or
Maine. If venue is established under the Alien Venue Act, the
requisite minimum contacts must still be shown to establish in
personam jurisdiction. Several cases, however, established the socalled the "national minimum contacts" test for establishing jurisdiction over foreign defendants. Under one version of this test,
if a foreign defendant has had the requisite minimum contacts
with a jurisdiction anywhere in the United States, and the particular violation was aimed at persons in the forum district, personal
jurisdiction is established. Whether this test is the law is a very
debatable subject. Even without the "national minimum contacts" test, however, the law with respect to personal jurisdiction
is quite expansive. Indeed, even if a foreign company does not
have the requisite contacts with the United States, jurisdiction
may nevertheless be established based on the activities of a
United States subsidiary of the foreign defendant. Thus, the activities of the subsidiary may be attributed to the foreign parent
if the parent exercises sufficient control over the management of
the subsidiary.
Service of process is another important aspect of in personam
jurisdiction. Service of process is covered in Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 4 is very expansive, and in the case
of a foreign defendant allows service by certified mail as well as
by other methods. Service, however, may have to be effectuated
under the Hague Convention for the Service of Process Abroad.
The Convention has special rules that vary from country to country depending upon the type of caveats made or conditions stipulated by a particular state when it entered into the Convention.
As previously indicated, subject matter jurisdiction concerns
the question of whether conduct is covered by a particular law.
Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be considered in the abstract;
the particular law in question must be examined. Most of the case
law on, and controversy about, subject matter jurisdiction has
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taken place in the antitrust area.
Subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act has long
been disputed and debated. The earliest case is American Banana Co. v. United Fruit,a 1909 case decided by Justice Holmes.
American Banana grew out of the activities of the United Fruit
Company. Early in this century, United Fruit was a powerful
force throughout Latin America and had a strong hold on the
farming of bananas for import into the United States. To a large
extent, United Fruit kept its monopoly by controlling, or at least
influencing, Latin American countries. The American Banana
Company decided that it would like to compete with United
Fruit. American Banana developed a certain amount of influence
in Colombia, which at that time stretched all the way up to what
is now Panama. United Fruit was apparently unhappy with the
encroachment by American Banana into the region. Using its influence in Costa Rica, United Fruit persuaded the Costa Rican
Government to help foment an independence movement and rebellion in the area that is now Panama. Aside from the fact that
it occurred outside the United States, this conduct clearly constituted an antitrust violation, probably the only antitrust violation
that had, as a byproduct, the creation of a country. Because it did
occur abroad, the United States Supreme Court determined that
the conduct of United Fruit was not within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. Justice Holmes thus adopted a
rule of strict territoriality, limiting the scope of the Sherman Act
to conduct that takes place within the geographical limits of the
United States.
American Banana has never been expressly overturned. In the
decades that followed the decision, subject matter jurisdiction
was found in a number of cases involving conduct inside as well
as outside the United States. In 1945 the law changed with Judge
Learned Hand's decision in United States v. Alcoa, which established a new approach to subject matter jurisdiction-the "effects
doctrine." Under this mode of analysis, if conduct outside the
United States has a sufficient effect inside the United States, it
falls within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Sherman Act.
Judge Hand realized that not all conduct outside the United
States having an effect inside the United States could be made
subject to the United States antitrust laws. The economies of the
world are so interconnected and interdependent that, for example, even a price-fixing conspiracy in Japan directed solely at the
Japanese market could have an impact in the United States. The
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potentially overbroad application of the effects doctrine, therefore, was limited by the further requirement that the conduct
must also be intended to have an effect in the United States. This
basic rule has been adopted in subsequent decisions under various rubrics requiring that the effect on United States commerce
be substantial, direct, and, if not intended, at least foreseeable.
In determining whether there is a substantial, direct, or forseeable effect on United States commerce, what is United States
commerce? In part, United States commerce may be defined as
United States domestic commerce. In this respect, the effects doctrine in the United States is not that different from the effects
doctrine in Germany or the Common Market. Both of these foreign entities recognize that conduct which has an effect on competition in those jurisdictions may come within the subject matter
jurisdiction of their antitrust laws. United States law, however,
also recognizes subject matter jurisdiction when there is the requisite effect on United States exports. This aspect of the doctrine
has tended to push subject matter jurisdiction to its furthest limits. For example, the Pacific Seafarers case involved a conspiracy
by a group of United States companies that shipped goods between Taiwan and Vietnam during the Vietnam War. The conspiracy between the shippers managed to exclude the plaintiff,
another United States shipper, from receiving business on this
route. The court found subject matter jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act because the conduct affected a United States company's export of shipping services, and, therefore, affected United
States export commerce. In another case involving the monopolization of tourist facilities in the Dominican Republic, subject
matter jurisdiction was found based on the impact of the defendants' activities on the export of tourists from the United States.
What are the practical consequences of the effects doctrine? Its
parameters can be gleaned from the 1977 Justice Department
Guide to Antitrust and International Operations. Although the
doctrine may be somewhat fuzzy at the edges it is clear that certain kinds of conduct are not within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. For example, suppose a United States
company has a licensing arrangement with a Japanese company
that states: "Any products manufactured by you under your license with us may not be shipped to Germany." This restriction
does not fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Sherman Act because it only affects commerce in Germany. (The resolution may, of course, constitute a violation of the German anti-
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trust laws.) Similarly, a tie-in arrangement under which a United
States seller conditions the sale of a particular product to a foreign buyer on the buyer's purchase of another product, the tie-in
would be within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Sherman
Act because it might exclude other United States companies. A
tie-in that merely required the foreign buyer to purchase the tied
product from a United States source, however, would not be
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Sherman Act because
the only persons it could possibly injure would be non-United
States sellers. In short, the United States antitrust laws are not
concerned with protecting foreign companies with respect to their
sales outside of the United States.
Another doctrine which limits the application of United States
antitrust law in the international context is the so-called jurisdictional rule of reason. This concept, originally developed by Kingman Brewster, was adopted in a number of cases in the late
1970s. It addresses the problem arising when conduct taking place
outside the United States has the requisite effect on United
States commerce, but a foreign state has an even stronger interest
in regulating the conduct than does the United States. If this situation does arise, a number of factors are to be considered. For
example, is the defendant a national of the country where the
conduct took place? Where were the effects of the conduct manifested? Did the conduct have a greater impact in the United
States or in the country where the conduct took place? The basic
principle underlying the jurisdictional rule of reason is that, even
where subject matter jurisdiction exists, a court should refrain
from exercising jurisdiction for reasons of comity where the circumstances make it appropriate to defer to the laws of a foreign
country.
A number of decisions in the 1970s developed this concept further. The decision of the Seventh Circuit in the Uranium Antitrust Litigation,however, departed from the teaching of the jurisdictional rule of reason, with the result that a major confrontation
ensued between the United States and some of its closest allies.
To understand the furor surrounding the Uranium Antitrust Litigation, it is important to understand the background of the case.
After World War II, the United States persuaded a number of its
allies, including Canada, South Africa, and Australia, to develop
their uranium resources for United States strategic and economic
policies. The United States then developed its nuclear energy industry to the point that it became the world's primary purchaser
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of uranium. The United States market alone accounted for threequarters of all the uranium sold in the world. The United States
then adopted an embargo law which provided that United States
buyers could only purchase uranium from United States sources.
As a result, three-quarters of the world uranium market was denied to foreign producers, and the bottom fell out of the uranium
market outside the United States. The foreign producers responded by forming a uranium cartel. The cartel was encouraged
by the foreign producers' respective governments which wanted to
protect their native uranium industries for both strategic and economic reasons. Because of the embargo, the cartel could directly
affect sales only outside of the United States. The cartel did,
however, limit production and fix prices of uranium produced
abroad. The United States Government never attempted to prosecute members of the cartel.
The Westinghouse Electric Company had entered into longterm delivery contracts for uranium with various utilities. These
contracts proved disastrous for Westinghouse when the market
price of uranium dramatically increased. The utilities sued Westinghouse for breach of contract when it refused to deliver the uranium, and Westinghouse in turn sued the cartel members for
fixing the price of uranium. Westinghouse claimed that although
the cartel operated outside the United States, its actions ultimately had an effect within the United States. Westinghouse alleged that the effect on United States uranium prices continued
to be felt even after the embargo had terminated and the cartel
had disbanded.
The foreign defendants, relying on what they believed was a
lack of jurisdiction, ignored service of process. Because they refused to appear, the district court, taking a different view of the
jurisdiction issue, found that the defendants had defaulted. On
appeal, the cause of the various foreign defendants was pleaded
by their respective governments. The British, South African, Australian, and. Canadian Governments all filed briefs arguing that
their interests were affected by the conduct in question and that,
under the jurisdictional rule of reason, a United States court
should defer to their concerns.
The Seventh Circuit declined to adopt these arguments and
found that it was within the discretion of the district court judge
to decide whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction. The
court stated that it was shocked at the extent of the foreign governments' subservience to the defendants. In fact, the foreign
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governments had asked the State Department to plead their position for them, and it was the State Department that suggested
the foreign governments make their own arguments to the court.
The foreign governments were understandably upset by the
Seventh Circuit's decision and showed their displeasure by passing laws to block the enforcement of United States antitrust laws.
Great Britain adopted the United Kingdom Protection of Trading
Interests Bill of 1980. This Act provides that the British Secretary of State can block the enforcement of United States antitrust decrees and discovery orders within Great Britain if such
blocking actions are in its interest. The Act also allows a British
defendant facing United States treble damage liability to reduce,
in effect, his liability for actual damages by giving him the right
to recover in the British Courts two-thirds of the treble damage
award paid to the United States plaintiff. This is generally referred to as the "clawback" provision. The Australians went beyond the British and drafted a bill that would have allowed, not
two-thirds, but a one hundred percent "clawback" of the United
States antitrust judgment. These bills, following in the wake of
the UraniumLitigation,created a significant conflict between the
United States and some of its principal allies.
In an attempt to resolve the conflict, numerous discussions between the United States and the affected foreign states have been
held. Recent United States case law has somewhat ameliorated
the problem by restricting the extraterritorial application of
United States antitrust law. Thus, for example, one court ruled
that no subject matter jurisdiction exists unless it can be established that a defendant's actions abroad had not only direct, substantial, and foreseeable consequences, but also anticompetitive
effects, within the United States. In addition, Congress has now
passed the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act which
codified the effects doctrine by requiring a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect on United States domestic commerce, import commerce, or exports by United States residents
before conduct abroad comes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the United States antitrust laws. In short, both United
States courts and Congress appear to be evidencing a heightened
sensitivity to foreign concerns with respect to subject matter
jurisdiction.
Subject matter jurisdiction is just one of a number of doctrines
that limit the application of United States antitrust laws to foreign conduct. Among other doctrines which have similar limiting
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effects is the Act of State Doctrine. The essence of this principle
is that United States antitrust laws are not intended to apply to
the acts of a foreign state. If private parties influence a foreign
government to act in a particular way that has an antitrust impact, a United States court cannot attack that conduct without
affronting the sovereignty of the foreign state. In addition to being intended to avoid the impropriety of attacking the conduct of
a foreign state, the Act of State Doctrine is concerned with the
separation of powers. Thus, the conduct of foreign policy is
deemed to be within the province of the executive branch, and
the judiciary is loathe to enter into areas that should be left to
the Department of State.
Related to the Act of State Doctrine is the Sovereign Compulsion Doctrine which allows a defendant to raise as an affirmative
defense to an antitrust action the fact that the defendant's actions were compelled by a foreign state. In order to establish this
defense, compulsion is required; a suggestion by a foreign government is not enough. One problem is that many countries prefer to
use persuasion and other similar methods short of compulsion to
convince their industries to pursue desired goals. In Japan, for
example, the technique of administrative guidance is often relied
upon; by using numerous informal as well as formal contacts, the
Japanese Government establishes a consensus on the desired
course of action within an industry, and then guides the industry
to do what the government perceives to be in the national
interest.
Another relevant doctrine is the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine.
In general, a foreign sovereign cannot be sued unless an exception
in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies. Perhaps the
most important exception covers the commercial conduct of a foreign state.
An interesting case that illustrates the interaction of the commercial conduct exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act and the Act of State Doctrine is the OPEC case. OPEC was
sued in California for fixing the price of oil. To avoid the risk that
OPEC would react to an adverse court order by taking retaliatory
actions in the oil market, the trial court exercised judicial selfrestraint by applying the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. It
found that, although the selling of oil resembled a commercial activity, it really involved the protection of natural resources and,
therefore, constituted sovereign activity. The Ninth Circuit
reached the same result but based on a different rationale. The
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court of appeals, relying on the Act of State Doctrine, recognized
that a resolution of the case would involve an attack on the conduct of foreign states and would have an adverse effect on United
States foreign policy.
Similar doctrines have developed in other nonantitrust areas.
For example, Vespa of America v. Bajajj Auto Limited involved
international licensing arrangements. Vespa manufactured motorscooters. Bajajj was an Indian company that also made motorscooters and was a licensee of Vespa. Although the license agreement expired, Bajajj continued to make motorscooters. Like many
other developing countries, India requires a foreign licensor to allow the licensee to retain the acquired technology and continue
producing at the end of the license term. Vespa brought suit in
the Southern District of California. It claimed that Bajajj had
breached its contract by manufacturing motorscooters after the
license expired. The court refused to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the contract because among other reasons, the Indian
Government has a very strong national policy allowing companies
like Bajajj to continue using acquired technology. Thus, a verdict
by a United States court in favor of the plaintiff would conflict
with this significant policy interest of the Indian Government.
Probably the most publicized area of dispute with respect to
subject matter jurisdiction has been United States export control
restrictions. A particularly controversial example is the issue of
the Soviet gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe. After the
suppression of Solidarity and the establishment of martial law in
Poland, the feeling of the United States Government was that the
Soviet Union should be taught a lesson. The solution was to impose export restrictions on high technology items used in the construction of the Soviet gas pipeline. Statutory authority which allows the President to impose export restrictions in the
furtherance of United States foreign policy does exist. President
Reagan extended the scope of the export restrictions to apply to
foreign subsidiaries and foreign licensees of United States companies. The order had a significant impact on several foreign companies. Dresser Industries, a United States company with a French
subsidiary, was particularly affected. The French subsidiary was
obligated to deliver twenty-three gas compressors to the Soviet
Union for use in the gas pipeline. The French Government issued
a directive to the company that required delivery of the compressors, and the company complied. The United States Government
imposed sanctions on Dresser that prohibited its French subsidi-
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ary from receiving any exported high-technology items or any information from the United States. The parent company, therefore, was effectively prevented from sending or transmitting any
type of know-how to its subsidiary. Dresser's French subsidiary
needed this information from its parent company to fulfill its
other contractual obligations. Dresser and another French company brought suit against the United States Department of Commerce to enjoin the sanctions on the grounds of lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The trial court refused to grant the injunction, pointing out that the sanctions were an important element
of United States foreign policy and that the matter was beyond
the scope of the court's jurisdiction. Dresser appealed the decision to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. Before
the court could make its determination, President Reagan lifted
the sanctions, thus rendering the case moot. Until the next case is
decided, no one will know the precise limits of subject matter jurisdiction under the Export Control Act.

